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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






JOCELYN INFANTE WAMINAL DIGENOVA, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                                                      Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-230-676) 
Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 13, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 








 Jocelyn Digenova (“Digenova”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition 
for review in part for lack of jurisdiction and deny it in part. 
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 Digenova, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United 
States as a non-immigrant visitor on June 23, 2004.  On August 31, 2004, she married 
Joseph Digenova, a United States citizen.  On March 4, 2006, she adjusted her status to 
that of a conditional lawful permanent resident on the basis of this marriage.  On January 
23, 2008, Digenova filed a Form I-751 Petition to Remove the Conditions on Residence, 
jointly with her U.S. citizen spouse.
1
  On May 5, 2009, however, her lawful status was 
terminated based on her failure to establish that she entered into her marriage in good 
faith.  That same day the Department of Homeland Security served her with a Notice to 
Appear, charging that she was removable pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i), based on the termination of her 
conditional lawful permanent resident status. 
 On June 10, 2009, Digenova filed a second Form I-751 Petition to Remove the 
Conditions, this time seeking a waiver of the requirement to jointly file the petition, see 
INA § 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4).  She claimed that the termination of her status, 
and her removal from the United States to the Philippines, would result in an extreme 
hardship to her.  See id.  In support of her waiver application, Digenova submitted 
documentary medical evidence indicating that she suffers from anemia and an iron 
deficiency, cervical and lumbar disc degeneration, arthritis, and allergies.  She also 
                                              
1
 An alien may obtain “conditional” permanent resident status based on her marriage to a 
United States citizen when the marriage was entered into less than two years prior to 
obtaining such status.  See INA § 216(a)(1), (b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1), (b)(1).  The 
conditional basis of the permanent resident status can be removed if the alien and the 
petitioning spouse jointly file a petition requesting the removal of such conditional basis 
and appear for a personal interview.  See INA § 216(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1). 
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provided country conditions evidence, including some reports which described health 
conditions in the Philippines during the 1980’s and the 1990’s, in support of an argument 
that health services for low-income persons in the Philippines are inadequate.  Digenova 
appeared before a USCIS field officer to provide testimony in support of her Form I-75l 
petition.  She testified that she has a four-year college degree in business administration 
obtained in the Philippines.  Before she entered the United States, she worked as an 
accounting clerk in the Philippines for approximately 12 years.  In the United States, 
Digenova worked as a billing clerk for a law firm, earning an annual salary of 
approximately $35,000.00. 
 On March 11, 2010, Digenova’s waiver application was denied by the U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Service (“USCIS”) for failure to show extreme hardship as 
required by the statute.  After hearing Digenova’s testimony and evidence, the USCIS 
field officer concluded that, because of her education and work experience, and her 
fluency in English and presumably Tagalog, she would be competitive in the job market 
in the Philippines.  The field officer noted that, in determining extreme hardship under 
the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e), only those factors arising after 
Digenova’s admission as a conditional permanent resident on March 4, 2006 could be 
considered.  Thus, the time period preceding March 4, 2006 was not relevant for purposes 
of establishing Digenova’s extreme hardship claim.  The field officer then considered 
Digenova’s documentary evidence and found that some of it related to the time period 
before she obtained conditional status and was therefore irrelevant.  Additionally, her 
other evidence did not establish a causal link between the alleged deficiencies in health 
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care services in the Philippines and her individual ability to obtain sufficient care for her 
health problems. 
 Regarding her conditions of anemia and iron deficiency, the field officer found no 
evidence that Digenova was currently taking any medication for these conditions or that 
she would be unable to obtain proper medical care for these conditions in the Philippines.  
Similarly, although her medical reports revealed that she has mild disc disease caused by 
arthritis, and that she was taking prescription and over-the-counter medication to manage 
her pain, she failed to submit a statement from her physician explaining that this 
condition could not be sufficiently managed in the Philippines.  Last, the field officer 
concluded that Digenova’s allergies did not provide a basis for concluding that she would 
suffer extreme hardship if removed because she did not provide any evidence that she 
would not be able to manage this common condition in the Philippines. 
 Digenova next appeared in Immigration Court in removal proceedings and 
requested that an immigration judge review the USCIS’s denial of a hardship waiver de 
novo, as was her right.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(f) (“No appeal shall lie from the decision 
of the director; however, the alien may seek review of such decision in removal 
proceedings.”).  On May 10, 2011, the IJ issued his decision, concluding that Digenova 
was removable as charged, and denying her request for a hardship waiver under INA § 
216(c)(4).  The IJ found that Digenova was diagnosed with cervical and lumbar disc 
degeneration in 2009.  The pain is daily although she does not miss much work.  She 
takes ibuprofen and a prescription medication, Gabapentin, every day to control her pain.  
She was advised to get follow-up care in January, 2010, but did not get that follow-up 
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care until another year had passed.  At the pain management facility she attends now, she 
has gotten two steroid injections.  She also goes to physical therapy one time a week, up 
to a maximum of 20 visits a year, as per her health insurance.  The IJ noted that one of 
Digenova’s medical reports showed mild disc degeneration due to arthritis. 
 The IJ found that Digenova presented no evidence that she had any significant 
allergies that would be detrimental to her in another country.  Thus, he focused on the 
pain Digenova suffers from her cervical and lumbar disc degeneration, a condition she 
suffers from at a relatively young age, in determining whether her removal would cause 
her extreme hardship.  In considering this evidence, the IJ emphasized that Digenova 
waited for approximately ten months between her diagnosis and physician-recommended 
follow-up before she actually started going for pain management treatment.  Digenova 
claimed that she delayed her follow-up because of her concern over her mother’s 
hospitalization in the Philippines, but the IJ emphasized that, ultimately, she had health 
insurance and still made a choice not to pursue medical care to resolve or alleviate her 
pain.  Further, the IJ noted that one of Digenova’s pain medications is ibuprofen, which is 
available over-the-counter, and presumably can be obtained in the Philippines. 
 Additionally, the IJ emphasized that Digenova’s primary concern was that she will 
get to the Philippines, be unemployed, and be forced into a pay-as-you-go medical 
system which she would be unable to afford, but she failed to submit evidence that the 
Philippines has a pay-as-you-go health care system, or really any evidence whatever of 
the kind of health care system that exists today in the Philippines.  Further, Digenova 
failed to present evidence that someone with her level of education and amount of work 
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experience would have difficulty finding employment in the Philippines.  One university 
article she submitted described the Philippines as a lower middle-income country with a 
commitment to the evaluation of health care services, and thus her evidence did not show 
that the Philippines is a country that ranks at the bottom of the economic scale, such as 
Mali or Haiti.  The IJ rejected Digenova’s request to take administrative notice of the 
economy of the Philippines, concluding that it was Digenova’s burden to show a link 
between the alleged deficient health care services in the Philippines and alleged poor job 
market on the one hand, and her individual ability to obtain sufficient care for her health 
problems on the other. 
 Digenova appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, contending that she had 
ample evidence to show that she would suffer extreme hardship if removed, and was 
therefore deserving of a section 216(c)(4) waiver.  Digenova contended that the IJ erred 
in confining his review to the evidence she had previously presented to the USCIS before 
removal proceedings had commenced.  With her appeal, Digenova submitted additional 
evidence in support of her hardship petition, including evidence of country conditions in 
the Philippines related to medical treatment, and further documentation regarding her 
medical conditions.  Her new evidence included a chart regarding the availability of 
treatment in the Philippines for her particular conditions, supported by e-mail 
correspondence from hospitals and a specialist in the Philippines, information on cervical 
and sacral transformational injection procedures, a summary of Digenova’s insurance 
claims and insurance coverage in the U.S. with her current job, information on the salary 
scale in the Philippines for the positions of accounting clerk, accounting staff and 
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certified public accountant/auditor, and examples of recent job postings in the 
Philippines.  Digenova also attached the results of her August 2011 colonoscopy and 
EGD, further blood examinations prescribed by her gastroenterologist in September, 
2011, the results of her June, 2011 cardio stress echogram, and other recent prescriptions 
and tests. 
 On February 8, 2012, the Board dismissed Digenova’s appeal, agreeing with the IJ 
that Digenova’s evidence of extreme hardship was not persuasive.  The Board rejected 
her contention that the IJ erred by limiting the evidence to documents that were 
considered by the USCIS.  On the contrary, the Board stated, the IJ’s decision 
specifically noted documents that were submitted subsequent to the USCIS termination 
notice.  To the extent that Digenova submitted new evidence on appeal, the Board 
additionally construed her appeal as a motion to remand.  The Board noted that a motion 
to remand, like a motion to reopen, will only be granted if the new evidence would likely 
change the result in the case, citing Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 
1992).  The Board then denied Digenova’s motion to remand on these grounds: (1) she 
did not explain why the evidence dated prior to her hearing was not available or could not 
have been discovered or presented at her hearing; (2) the new evidence of hardship that 
pertained to matters occurring outside of the relevant time period (i.e., evidence of 
hardship which arose after Digenova’s conditional residence status was terminated) was 
not material; and (3) the motion did not include an affidavit from Digenova explaining 
how the new evidence supported her claim of extreme hardship. 
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 Digenova has timely petitioned for review of the Board’s decision.  We generally 
have jurisdiction over petitions for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1), but 
we lack jurisdiction to review a challenge to the agency’s discretionary denial of an 
application for a hardship waiver, see id. at § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).  Section 216(c)(4) of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4), expressly specifies that “the Attorney General, in the 
Attorney General’s discretion, may remove the conditional basis of the permanent 
resident status for an alien who fails to” file a joint petition if that alien demonstrates that 
“extreme hardship would result if such alien is removed.”  The statute further provides 
that “[t]he determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that 
evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General.”  Id.  Because this 
provision gives the Attorney General sole discretion to grant a hardship waiver, we held 
in Urena-Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2004), that INA § 216(c)(4) 
waiver decisions are exempted from judicial review. 
 Despite this jurisdictional bar, we retain jurisdiction to review constitutional 
claims or questions of law, INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Here, while 
Digenova attempts to frame her argument as one of law, she is merely arguing that the 
evidence she submitted showed that extreme hardship would result if she was removed.  
She claims that the agency erred in failing to consider the record as a whole and by 
limiting the evidence it would consider.  See Petitioner’s Brief, at 15, 18-22.  An 
argument that the agency incorrectly weighed evidence or failed to consider evidence is 
not a question of law under section 1252(a)(2)(d).  See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
483 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007) (recasting challenges to factual or discretionary 
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determinations as due process or constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to establish 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).  Digenova’s argument that the IJ was 
required to take administrative notice of the economic conditions in the Philippines, and 
argument that the IJ limited the evidence that could be considered in the hardship waiver 
proceedings, are nothing more than challenges to the agency’s discretionary 
determination and are insufficient to establish jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D).  In any event, it was Digenova’s burden to present evidence.  The IJ may 
only take notice of commonly known facts such as current events or the contents of 
official documents, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), and the employment outlook in the 
Philippines as it relates specifically to Digenova’s  qualifications and ability to find work 
and thus be able to afford health care, is not a commonly known fact.  Similarly, the 
record belies any assertion that the IJ limited the evidence that could be considered. 
 Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for review, in part for lack of 
jurisdiction.  We will deny the petition for review to the extent of Digenova’s motion to 
remand.  We review the denial of a motion to reopen/remand for an abuse of discretion. 
See Shardar v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 503 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Board’s 
decision will be upheld unless it was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Guo v. 
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Tipu v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
A motion to remand for the purpose of submitting additional evidence is treated as 
a motion to reopen the proceedings before the IJ.  See Huang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 620 
F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 2010); Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 471 (“[W]here a 
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motion to remand is really in the nature of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, 
it must comply with the substantive requirements for such motions.”).  A motion to 
reopen must be based on affidavits or other evidentiary material which were not 
“available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the prior hearing before 
the IJ.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  In Digenova’s case, the Board properly found that she 
did not explain why the evidence dated prior to her hearing on May 10, 2011 was not 
available or could not have been discovered or presented at that time.  Furthermore, “[a] 
motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless” the “evidence sought to be 
offered is material.”  Id.  The Board properly found that the new evidence of hardship 
that pertained to matters that occurred after Digenova’s conditional resident status was 
terminated was not “material” and thus did not support her motion to remand.  See INA § 
216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (“In determining extreme hardship, the Attorney 
General shall consider circumstances occurring only during the period the alien was 
admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.”). 
Digenova has argued that the Board erred in rejecting her evidence of “continuing 
medical hardship” as immaterial.  See Petitioner’s Brief, at 20.  She argues that, although 
the medical evidence provided was dated after the hearing, it related specifically to 
medical conditions arising during the period of conditional residence.  Id. at 21.  It is true, 
as Digenova argues, that the Board has a duty to explicitly consider material evidence 
submitted in support of a motion to reopen, Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 
268 (3d Cir. 2008), but Digenova has pointed to no specific item of material evidence she 
believes the Board overlooked, nor has she explained how this new evidence supports her 
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claim of extreme hardship.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Digenova’s motion to reopen/remand. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review in part for lack 
of jurisdiction and deny it in part. 
